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Vehicles of Attention and Suggestion
Michael Lifshitz, BA*; Amir Raz, PhD, ABPH†
Although hypnosis and meditation represent distinct domains of practice, they appear to over-
lap in phenomenology, cognitive mechanisms, neural substrates, and potential therapeutic merits. 
Whereas numerous studies have documented the beneficial impact of these approaches, few have 
harnessed these distinctive phenomena together, either clinically or as a means of illuminating 
cognitive questions.  This paper introduces the theme of the present issue and discusses the poten-
tial value of yoking empirical studies of hypnosis and meditation.  The marriage of these seemingly 
disparate yet overlapping practices promises to improve our scientific understanding of each as 
well as unravel their underlying mechanisms.  On the one hand, albeit largely overlooked by re-
searchers studying meditation, the intimate relationship between attention and suggestion holds 
important implications for both theoretical models and therapeutic applications of contemplative 
practice.  On the other hand, hypnosis and meditation serve as complementary vehicles for eluci-
dating salient topics in cognitive neuroscience, including the neural underpinnings of perception 
and cognitive control, and the governing of deeply-ingrained processes.  Binding these approaches 
to the science of attention and suggestion paves the road to a more nuanced appreciation of hypno-
sis and meditation while fostering novel therapeutic prospects and improving our understanding 
of consciousness and cognition.
Introduction
Until recently, folk beliefs and popular miscon-
ceptions shrouded the empirical study of hypno-
sis and meditation and dimmed their promise as 
research instruments.  Current investigative tech-
niques, however, have done much to demystify 
these phenomena and dispel antiquated charac-
terizations associating them with complete sen-
sory withdrawal and mindless trance.  Over the 
past decade, a surge of scientific research drawing 
on both hypnosis and meditation has document-
ed their influence on a host of processes ranging 
from attention and emotion to brain function and 
physiology (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 
2008; Oakley & Halligan, 2009).  Methodological 
and theoretical advances in cognitive neurosci-
ence have offered new prospects for elucidating 
these practices from an empirical perspective 
(Cahn & Polich, 2006; Raz & Shapiro, 2002).  On 
the flip side, researchers have begun employing 
hypnosis and meditation as vehicles for investi-
gating fundamental processes of mind and brain 
(Raz, 2011), including perception (Carter et al., 
2005; Cohen Kadosh, Henik, Catena, Walsh, & 
Fuentes, 2009), self-regulation (Egner & Raz, 
2007; Tang, Rothbart, & Posner, 2012), and neu-
roplasticity (Slagter, Davidson, & Lutz, 2011).  In 
addition to such research-centred applications, 
mounting clinical evidence has underscored the 
potential therapeutic merits of these contempla-
tive approaches and propelled a swelling wave of 
mindfulness- and suggestion-based treatments 
in medical practice (Baer, 2003; Lynn, Kirsch, 
Barabasz, Cardeña, & Patterson, 2000).  These 
developments have allowed hypnosis and medi-
tation to shake off many layers of misunderstand-
ing and gain a solid footing in the realms of both 
cognitive research and therapeutic practice.  The 
time is therefore ripe to explore the potential 
fruits of bridging these approaches.  
Bridging the domains of hyp-
nosis and meditation
Although hypnosis and meditation represent dis-
tinct domains of practice, they seem to overlap 
in phenomenology, and perhaps also in terms 
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of cognitive mechanisms, neural substrates, and 
potential therapeutic merits.  And yet, research-
ers specializing in hypnosis and meditation 
hardly interact, perhaps because these practices 
originate from different cultural, philosophi-
cal and geographical traditions (Johnson, 1982; 
Pintar & Lynn, 2008).  Indeed, the scientific lit-
erature contains only sparse scattered accounts 
addressing hypnosis and meditation side by 
side (e.g., Davidson & Goleman, 1977; Grant & 
Rainville, 2005; Halsband, Mueller, Hinterberger, 
& Strickner, 2009; Holroyd, 2003; Lynn, Das, 
Hallquist, & Williams, 2006; Spiegel, White, & 
Waelde, 2010).  The present special issue brings 
together expert perspectives from the study of 
hypnosis and meditation to sketch recent em-
pirical advances and explore the similarities and 
differences between these unique forms of self-
regulation.  In this introductory paper, I provide 
a cursory synthesis of the views presented in this 
issue and discuss the potential value of yoking 
the scientific studies of hypnosis and meditation. 
This crosstalk will likely bring about a more nu-
anced appreciation of the underlying mechanisms 
of these practices, while also fostering novel ther-
apeutic prospects and elucidating prominent top-
ics in cognitive research.  
Hypnosis and meditation each refer to a broad 
range of practices that emanate from diverse cul-
tural and historical traditions, invoke various 
cognitive and behavioural stances, and aim at a 
plethora of therapeutic and soteriological out-
comes — from analgesia to enlightenment.  The 
heterogeneity among goals and techniques within 
these domains poses a significant challenge to 
developing inclusive definitions of such practic-
es.  Beyond the sheer diversity of activities fall-
ing under the labels of hypnosis and meditation, 
inconsistent interpretations of key terms — e.g, 
“hypnosis” (Kirsch et al., 2011) and “mindful-
ness” (Williams & Kabat-Zinn, 2011) — may fur-
ther obfuscate central concepts and impede the 
progress of research on these topics.  Developing 
a rigorous science of atypical cognition, therefore, 
would involve relinquishing reliance on the terms 
of tradition in favour of precise operational defi-
nitions founded upon robust phenomenologi-
cal, behavioural, and physiological data.  In his 
commentary, Grant (this issue) describes several 
potential pitfalls associated with glazing over the 
particularities of individual practices and conflat-
ing different stages of those practices.  His contri-
bution provides an important reminder to remain 
vigilant of these caveats when investigating hyp-
nosis and meditation, especially in a comparative 
context.  Moving forward in this way — exploring 
overlaps while remaining mindful of distinctions 
and shades of meaning — would likely lead to a 
more scientific understanding of these phenom-
ena (cf Manna et al., 2010; Raz, 2007).  
Binding the study of  
attention to the science of 
suggestion
Considering hypnosis and meditation together 
may force us to take a more critical glance at 
how we construe these practices, and could po-
tentially highlight mechanisms that researchers 
have largely overlooked to date.  Most forms of 
meditation share the essential feature of attention 
regulation. Drawing on traditional Buddhist per-
spectives, scientists generally classify meditation 
practices into two non-exhaustive categories: fo-
cused attention and open monitoring (Lutz, et al., 
2008).  Focused attention involves single-pointed 
concentration on an experiential object such as 
the breath or a mantra.   Open monitoring, on 
the other hand, involves broadening attention to 
include the whole field of moment-to-moment 
experience.  Although such conceptual bifurca-
tions are useful, many meditative practices do not 
fall neatly within this dichotomous schema (e.g., 
compassion, visualization, and analytic practic-
es; Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson, 2006).  Typically, 
however, most of the meditative techniques gain-
ing prominence in cognitive science and clinical 
practice employ some combination of focused at-
tention and open monitoring to cultivate a non-
reactive, receptive awareness of present-moment 
experience.  
Similarly to scientists studying meditation, 
researchers interested in hypnosis often place at-
tention at the center of their theoretical models 
and empirical accounts. Historically, hypnosis 
was associated with a special state of conscious-
ness sometimes known as “trance”.  To this day, 
however, scholars and practitioners have reached 
little consensus regarding the psychological char-
acteristics of this putative hypnotic state, let alone 
identified reliable neurophysiological indices sup-
porting its existence (Oakley & Halligan, 2009, 
2010).  Nevertheless, despite the paucity of data 
demonstrating a distinct neurocognitive state of 
hypnosis, studies have reported substantial, albeit 
at times inconsistent, links between attention and 
hypnotic capacities (Dienes et al., 2009).  In ad-
dition, numerous cognitive and neuroimaging 
reports have documented the power of sugges-
tion over attention functions and their associated 
brain networks (Egner, Jamieson, & Gruzelier, 
2005; Iani, Ricci, Baroni, & Rubichi, 2009; Iani, 
Ricci, Gherri, & Rubichi, 2006; Priftis et al., 2011; 
Raz & Campbell, 2011; Raz, Fan, & Posner, 2005; 
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Terhune, Cardeña, & Lindgren, 2011).  More 
prevalently, brief verbal suggestions comprising 
only a few words can lead to profound alterations 
in perception, cognition, and behaviour among 
responsive — i.e., highly suggestible — individu-
als (Kihlstrom, 2008).  Suggestion and attention, 
therefore, reflect two central thematic intersec-
tions for exploring the convergence between hyp-
nosis and meditation.  
Numerous scientific accounts leveraging be-
havioural, genetic, and neuroimaging methods 
have documented the association between sug-
gestion and attention (Raz, 2004, 2005; Raz & 
Buhle, 2006).  Hardly a unitary concept, atten-
tion refers broadly to the allocation of cognitive 
processing resources.  Most current models break 
down the process of attention into distinct brain 
areas and networks that mediate different sub-
processes (e.g., monitoring, control, and orienting 
functions; Petersen & Posner, 2012).  The prepon-
derance of the evidence indicates that attention 
and suggestion draw on overlapping functional 
neuroanatomy, neural circuitry, chemical modu-
lators, and cellular structures (Fernandez-Duque 
& Posner, 2001; Posner & Fan, 2004; Raz & Buhle, 
2006).  Guided by such brain findings, research-
ers have related specific genetic polymorphisms 
to well-defined neurocognitive phenotypes, in-
cluding those associated with different styles of 
attention and responses to hypnotic suggestion 
(Lichtenberg, Bachner-Melman, Gritsenko, & 
Ebstein, 2000; Raz, 2005; Szekely et al., 2010). 
Such multipronged approaches combining ge-
netic and neuroimaging assays of both attention 
and hypnotic response pave the way to answering 
questions such as how highly suggestible individ-
uals differ from less-suggestible persons.  Similar 
methods could be used to elucidate individual 
differences among practitioners of meditation 
and may provide an avenue for beginning to cus-
tom-tailor mindfulness-based approaches to spe-
cific individuals.  Future work probing hypnosis 
and meditation, therefore, would help shed light 
on the relationship between attention and sugges-
tion in both typical and atypical cognition. 
Several papers in the current special issue in-
tegrate the themes of attention and suggestion to 
explore the similarities and differences between 
hypnosis and meditation.  Semmens-Wheeler 
and Dienes (this issue) argue that whereas both 
hypnosis and meditation are potent modulators 
of attention, they differ fundamentally in terms 
of metacognition — i.e., explicit knowledge of the 
contents of one’s own experience.  Mindfulness 
meditation, they assert, aims at cultivating aware-
ness of one’s experience, whereas hypnosis relies 
on a failure of metacognition, especially concern-
ing knowledge of one’s own intentions.  In his 
commentary, Terhune et al. (this issue) prompts 
a lively theoretical exchange concerning future 
possibilities for testing such metacognitive the-
ories of hypnosis (see also the reply by Dienes 
and Semmens-Wheeler (this issue)).  Lynn, 
Malakataris, Maxwell, Mellinger, & van der Kloet 
(this issue) propose a broader model of attention 
in hypnosis and meditation.  They outline a pop-
ular conception of mindfulness — i.e., purposeful, 
nonjudgmental attention to the unfolding of ex-
perience on a moment-to-moment basis — as the 
central feature of many meditative techniques. 
Unlike most mindfulness-based approaches, hyp-
nosis typically involves suggestions emphasizing 
specific, and often unusual, behaviours or per-
ceptual experiences (e.g., hallucinations) rather 
than targeting attention or meta-cognition per 
se.  Lynn et al. (this issue) argue, however, that 
mindfulness-based practices do fall within the 
broad domain of suggestion, albeit harnessing 
suggestion specifically to cultivate sustained at-
tention and moment-to-moment monitoring of 
experience.  They construe the defining feature 
of hypnosis as the flexibility it affords for modu-
lating features of consciousness, rather than as 
one particular or special state of attention.  In 
line with this view, hypnotic phenomena typi-
cally follow even in the absence of an induction 
ritual or explicit mention of the context of hyp-
nosis (Mazzoni et al., 2009; McGeown et al., 2012; 
Raz, Kirsch, Pollard, & Nitkin-Kaner, 2006). 
Furthermore, responses to suggestions in a hyp-
notic context correlate strongly with responses to 
the same suggestions outside of hypnosis (Kirsch 
& Braffman, 2001).  Thus, the intimate relation-
ship between suggestion and attention appears 
to extend beyond the specific context of hypno-
sis and may hold significant implications for the 
empirical understanding and therapeutic applica-
tions of contemplative practice.  
The scientific literature on hypnosis offers 
a rich storehouse of knowledge concerning the 
power of suggestion to influence mind, brain, 
and behaviour.  Conversely, scholarly discus-
sions regarding the mechanisms of meditation 
rarely address the potential impact of suggestion. 
Although expectation and suggestion constitute 
explicit defining features of hypnosis, they may 
also play an important, albeit more tacit, role in 
meditation.   For example, many practice-orient-
ed accounts of contemplative training emphasize 
the importance of a relationship with a qualified 
teacher (McLeod, 2005), both in one-on-one en-
counters and through the tradition of dharma 
talks (i.e., oral presentations that a teacher offers a 
congregation of practitioners during formal med-
itation practice).  Although largely overlooked 
in the scientific literature on meditation, such 
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psychosocial interactions likely involve a wealth 
of suggestive prompts and expectancy cues that 
may contribute to the development and outcomes 
of contemplative practices.  As a case in point, a 
recent study demonstrated that motivation and 
effort may account for much of the improvement 
in attention usually ascribed to mindfulness prac-
tice (Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 
2012).  To explore such issues, Farb (this issue) 
offers a proposal for considering how intentions 
and expectations may help drive the benefits of 
standard mindfulness practices beyond the influ-
ence of attention training as such.  His contribu-
tion illustrates how a comparative perspective can 
guide the development of theoretical models of 
meditation and aid in refining mindfulness-based 
approaches.  Of importance, Farb’s proposed role 
for expectation in meditation hardly discredits 
the specific effects of attention training in these 
practices.  The hypnosis literature may be instruc-
tive in this regard.  Studies investigating the role 
of expectation in hypnosis indicate that attitu-
dinal factors such as expectation and intention 
typically interact with aptitudinal factors such as 
attentional efficiency in shaping hypnotic respon-
siveness (Benham, Woody, Wilson, & Nash, 2006; 
Lifshitz, Howells, & Raz, 2012).  Further research 
would be necessary to explore whether a similar 
relationship holds in the meditative practices. 
This special issue aims to lay the groundwork for 
such future endeavours.
Elucidating fundamental 
processes of consciousness 
and cognition
Gaining control over undesirable patterns of be-
haviour and cognition is a central aim common 
to many forms of hypnosis and meditation.  This 
notion maps closely onto the conceptual distinc-
tion typical within the cognitive sciences between 
mental processes that are controlled and those 
that are automatic.  Whereas controlled processes 
are voluntary, slow, and effortful, automatic pro-
cesses are involuntary, fast, and effortless (Shiffrin 
& Schneider, 1977).  Achieving literacy, for ex-
ample, is a controlled and deliberate process re-
quiring attention.  Once learned and sufficiently 
practiced, however, reading becomes an automat-
ic process, proceeding quickly and without effort 
(MacLeod, 1992).  A common view posits that 
extensive practice can render effortful processes 
more automatic (MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988). 
Once automatized, moreover, these processes ap-
pear resistant to control and largely imperturb-
able.  Such overlearned habits form the backbone 
of many mental disorders; consider, for example, 
the centrality of ruminative thinking in depres-
sion (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008) and the significance of impulsive behav-
iour among disorders of self-regulation such 
as Tourrette’s Syndrome (Wright, Rickards, & 
Cavanna, 2011).  Thus, in addition to advancing 
our understanding of volitional control, gaining 
control over deeply-ingrained processes would 
hold important implications for clinical inter-
ventions (Kuyken et al., 2008; Raz et al., 2009). 
Yet, while many studies have investigated how 
controlled processes become automatic, only a 
few recent reports have examined how automatic 
processes can de-automatize and return into the 
purview of control.  
Hypnosis and meditation provide comple-
mentary prospects for investigating the modula-
tion of automatic processes (Lifshitz, Campbell, 
& Raz, in press).  A growing body of research 
shows that various forms of suggestion can de-
rail processes previously considered ballistic and 
impervious to willful intervention (Campbell, 
Blinderman, Lifshitz, & Raz, in press).  One 
study, for example, demonstrated the influence of 
hypnotic suggestion on colour processing in the 
brain (Kosslyn, Thompson, Costantini-Ferrando, 
Alpert, & Spiegel, 2000).  Highly suggestible in-
dividuals were able to see grayscale images in co-
lour and perceive only shades of gray when view-
ing colourful displays upon suggestion.  These 
phenomenological changes manifested alongside 
alterations in low-level neural processes associ-
ated with colour perception.  An independent 
group, moreover, recently replicated these find-
ings using nonhypnotic suggestion in the absence 
of a formal induction procedure (McGeown, et 
al., 2012).  Another example of how suggestion 
governs deeply ingrained processes employs the 
gold standard of visual attention — the Stroop 
task (Stroop, 1935).  This classic experimental 
paradigm shows that skilled readers seem un-
able to withhold accessing word meaning despite 
explicit instructions to attend to ink colour only. 
Although most cognitive scientists consider pro-
cessing printed linguistic stimuli inevitable for 
skilled readers (MacLeod, 1992), multiple re-
ports demonstrate that a specific suggestion to 
see word stimuli as meaningless symbols can 
override the automaticity of reading in a classic 
Stroop paradigm (Raz & Campbell, 2011; Raz et 
al., 2003; Raz, Moreno-Iniguez, Martin, & Zhu, 
2007; Raz, Shapiro, Fan, & Posner, 2002).  Recent 
neuroimaging assays have begun to unravel the 
mechanisms of de-automatization as a func-
tion of suggestion (Casiglia et al., 2010; Raz, et 
al., 2005; Terhune, Cardeña, & Lindgren, 2010), 
while behavioural accounts have extended these 
effects to related cognitive processes (Iani, et al., 
2009; Iani, et al., 2006) and alternative forms of 
suggestion (Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Parris, 
Dienes, & Hodgson, 2012; Raz, et al., 2006).  
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In addition to suggestion-based approaches, 
meditative practices provide a powerful means 
of gaining control over automatic processes.  For 
example, specific forms of meditation appear 
to override habitual responses associated with 
spontaneous thought (Mrazek, Smallwood, & 
Schooler, 2012; Pagnoni, Cekic, & Guo, 2008), in-
voluntary emotional reactivity (Farb et al., 2010; 
Taylor et al., 2011), and pain processing (Zeidan, 
Grant, Brown, McHaffie, & Coghill, 2012).  In 
contrast to the rapid and transient alterations 
induced by hypnotic suggestion, moreover, the 
cognitive changes brought about through medi-
tative training appear in some cases to reflect 
enduring transformations (see Slagter et al., 
2011).  Independent neuroimaging studies draw-
ing separately on hypnosis and meditation have 
investigated the de-automatization of word read-
ing using a classic Stroop paradigm (Kozasa et 
al., 2012; Raz, et al., 2005; Teper & Inzlicht, 2012). 
Comparing these autonomous reports reveals no-
table albeit preliminary overlaps among the func-
tional neural correlates of these distinct strategies 
of self-regulation (Lifshitz, et al., in press).  Future 
work would be necessary to elucidate these appar-
ent intersections and further explore the mecha-
nisms supporting the modulation of automaticity 
as a function of hypnosis and meditation.  The 
results of these efforts would help pave the road 
to a more scientific understanding of volitional 
control in health as well as in pathology.  
Over the past decade, approaches to study-
ing brain function have shifted dramatically from 
purely task-based paradigms toward methods of 
investigating the subject at rest, in the absence of 
external stimulation (Raichle, 2010).  Today, the 
concepts of the “resting state” and the “default 
mode” of brain function may seem inexorably 
bound and in some circles even synonymous. 
A closer look at the history of research on these 
topics, however, reveals that the notion of a uni-
fied default mode resting state network emerged 
through an integration of what were initially two 
isolated research trajectories harnessing distinct 
methodological and theoretical frameworks to 
address different physiological and cognitive 
questions (for a historical review, see Callard 
& Margulies, 2011).  On the one hand, in the 
early 2000s, Marcus Raichle and colleagues at 
Washington University forged a cognitive neu-
roscience of internal experience through linking 
the functional roles of brain regions that are more 
active during rest — i.e., the default mode — to 
the psychology of spontaneous thought or mind-
wandering (Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle & Snyder, 
2007).  On the other hand, an independent 
group of researchers led by Bharat Biswal at the 
University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee explored 
the possibility that baseline physiological activ-
ity — i.e., the resting state — might hold important 
clues for elucidating the functional architecture 
of the brain (Biswal, Zerrin Yetkin, Haughton, & 
Hyde, 1995).  The associations between the fields 
of spontaneous psychological activity and spon-
taneous physiological activity in the resting brain 
were less obvious than they may appear to us to-
day.  Indeed, no cross citations existed between 
these two research trajectories until 2003, when 
Michael Greicius, a young researcher at Stanford 
University, integrated these perspectives to in-
troduce the notion of a “default mode network” 
(DMN; Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon, 
2003).  This creative synthesis launched a mutu-
ally productive exchange of theories and methods 
and heralded the burgeoning field of resting-state 
neuroimaging as we know it today.  The above 
glimpse into the history of the concept of the 
DMN provides a crude analogy for the prospect 
of binding the domains of hypnosis and medita-
tion and highlights the benefits of espousing a 
historical perspective on current scientific trends. 
Around the time that researchers were shift-
ing their focus from task-evoked processes to 
spontaneous brain dynamics, another compa-
rable shift began to transpire in the cognitive sci-
ences: whereas traditional studies had centered 
on controlling the experimental task, new para-
digms explored the potential of manipulating 
instead the attention of the participant (Raz & 
Buhle, 2006).  By providing a means of generat-
ing profound and highly-specific alterations in 
attention and consciousness, hypnosis and medi-
tation emerged as useful tools in the armamen-
tarium of the cognitive scientist.  Accordingly, 
in the past few years researchers have begun 
employing these potent top–down elicitors in 
concert with resting state methods to elucidate 
the psychological correlates of the DMN (e.g., 
Brewer et al., 2011; Deeley et al., 2012; Demertzi 
et al., 2011; Hasenkamp, Wilson-Mendenhall, 
Duncan, & Barsalou, 2012; McGeown, Mazzoni, 
Venneri, & Kirsch, 2009; Pagnoni, 2012; Pyka et 
al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2012).  Although hypnosis 
and meditation differ in many respects, compar-
ing how they modulate neurocognitive processes 
including the DMN may shed light on the mecha-
nisms underlying these unique and overlapping 
forms of self-regulation.  Dumont, Martin, & 
Broer (this issue) provide a selective review that 
highlights important discrepancies among the 
findings of neuroimaging studies investigating 
the DMN and other processes such as pain per-
ception and emotion regulation in hypnosis and 
meditation.  Based on the inconsistencies they 
uncover, Dumont et al. conclude that it is pre-
mature to claim that these practices are mediated 
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by similar neural mechanisms.  This conclusion 
hardly comes as a surprise given that even within 
the domains of hypnosis and meditation, studies 
often report mixed and sometimes contradic-
tory findings.  In this respect, the commentary 
by Grant (this issue) serves as a starting point 
for considering operational nuances that may in-
fluence the outcomes of these studies, including 
practice style and stage of training, wording and 
delivery of suggestion, and individual differences 
in responsiveness.  To be sure, the comparative 
literature concerning hypnosis and meditation is 
still nascent, especially in regard to neural under-
pinnings.  Rather than provide definitive conclu-
sions, therefore, the articles in this special issue 
reveal the potential of integrating these fields to 
foster a more conceptually refined and method-
ologically rigorous exploration of these practices.
Conclusion
Both specialists and novices have much to gain 
from bridging the domains of hypnosis and med-
itation.  Whereas numerous studies have docu-
mented the clinical effectiveness of these prac-
tices, few experts have compared these special 
phenomena to examine therapeutic power as well 
as the ability to illuminate cognitive questions. 
Juxtaposing hypnosis and meditation would 
likely improve our scientific descriptions of their 
phenomenological, psychological, and neural 
correlates.  The robust relationship between sug-
gestion and attention is largely overlooked in 
meditation research; yet, several papers in this 
special issue propose that parameters such as 
suggestion, expectation, and intention may play 
a more substantial role in meditative practice 
than heretofore acknowledged.  Beyond elucidat-
ing the intrinsic characteristics of hypnosis and 
meditation, the papers in the present collection 
showcase these potent top–down elicitors as ve-
hicles for investigating salient topics, including 
the neural underpinnings of perception and cog-
nitive control, and the de-automatization of ha-
bitual processes.  Hypnosis is particularly apt for 
developmental studies because most children are 
highly responsive to suggestions (Raz, in press). 
Further inquiries into the developmental trajec-
tories of these phenomena, therefore, may hold 
important implications for the emerging field of 
contemplative education (Davidson et al., 2012). 
This special issue reflects the beginning of a 
promising marriage between two fields.  The fol-
lowing collection of papers offers a sorely lacking 
integration and synthesis of relevant insights con-
cerning hypnosis and meditation.
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